I am writing because today the government has made an important decision about the future security and resilience of our 5G and full fibre networks.
The government’s Telecoms Supply Chain Review set out plans to implement one of the toughest regimes in the world for telecoms security. It proposed that all operators would be required by law to raise security standards and that the government be given new powers to allow it to respond as technology and risks change.
A critical aspect of this was addressing High Risk Vendors. In January, we set out to Parliament our conclusions on how we would define and restrict high risk vendors, keeping them outside the network’s core and away from critical infrastructure and sites. We were clear from the start that Huawei was considered a High Risk Vendor and that the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) would review and update its advice guidance on them as necessary.
A new position on high risk vendors in our 5G networks
Since January the situation has changed. New US sanctions threaten Huawei’s supply chain and the company’s ability to support UK operators, making it nearly impossible to assure Huawei’s long-term resilience in UK 5G networks.
Our world-leading experts at the NCSC have conducted a thorough review of the US action and what this means for the UK. The government agrees with the NCSC’s advice: the best way to secure our networks is for operators to stop using new Huawei equipment to build the UK's future 5G networks.
So from the end of this year, telecoms operators must not buy any new 5G equipment from Huawei. Once the Telecoms Security Bill is passed it will be illegal to do so.
I know that colleagues have also sought a commitment from the government to remove Huawei equipment from our 5G network altogether. In light of these concerns and the new analysis from the NCSC, I have concluded that it is necessary and prudent to commit to a timetable for the removal of Huawei equipment from our 5G network by 2027.
This requirement will be set out in law by the Telecoms Security Bill. It means that by the time of the next election, we will have implemented in law an irreversible path for the complete removal of Huawei equipment from our 5G networks.
Impact of this decision
This decision will have consequences for every constituency in the country and delay our 5G rollout ambitions. Our decisions in January had already set back rollout by a year and added costs of up to a billion pounds. Today’s decisions mean a cumulative delay to 5G rollout of two to three years and costs of up to £2 billion.
This will have knock-on impacts for operators’ ability to maintain and upgrade today’s mobile networks - with real consequences for the connections our constituents all rely on. To go further and faster than this would add considerable - and unnecessary - costs and delays. And the shorter we make the timetable, the greater the risk of actual disruption to mobile telecoms networks.
A different approach for full fibre
We also need to ensure that other networks - although fundamentally different to 5G - are as secure and resilient as our new mobile technology.
Reflecting the advice of the National Cyber Security Centre, we will need to take a different approach to full fibre network - one that recognises that it is different to 5G in terms of its technology, security, and the vendors supporting it.
Given there is only one other appropriate scale vendor for full fibre equipment, we are embarking on a short technical consultation with operators to understand their supply chain alternatives, so that we can avoid unnecessary delays to our gigabit ambitions and prevent significant resilience risks. The technical consultation will determine the nature of our rigorous approach to Huawei outside our 5G networks.
Market diversification
One of the reasons we are in this situation is because of global market failure. Put simply, countries around the world have become dangerously reliant on too few vendors.
My department is working at pace to develop a targeted diversification strategy that will focus on securing three key outcomes: securing the incumbent - non high risk - vendors within our networks today; attracting a third scale vendor into the UK; and accelerating the development of alternative radio technologies such a OpenRAN in order to open up and grow the supply market. We will also work with the US, Five Eyes and other partners to develop new supply chain capacity on a global scale.
Telecoms Security Bill
Today’s decisions will substantially change what is in the Telecoms Security Bill, which we had proposed to bring back before the summer. We will now introduce the Bill to Parliament in the Autumn. It is in all our interests for the legislation to be introduced and passed as soon as possible so that we can put our telecoms security advice on a secure statutory footing.
We will engage colleagues fully ahead of the introduction of the Bill. It is an essential piece of legislation without which we will not have the legal powers to enforce the decisions I have referred to or to protect the future security and resilience of our telecoms networks. Once the legislation has been laid I hope you feel able to support it.
Yours sincerely,
Rt Hon Oliver Dowden CBE MP
Secretary of State for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport